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Abstract This study examines the heterogeneous appraiser behavior and
its implication on traditional appraisal smoothing theory. The
ﬁndings demonstrate that the partial adjustment model is
consistent with the traditional appraisal smoothing argument
only when all appraisers choose the same smoothing technique.
However, if appraiser behavior is heterogeneous and exhibits
cross-sectional variation due to the difference in their access to,
and interpretation of information, the model actually leads to a
mixed outcome: The variance of the appraisal-based returns can
be higher or lower than the variance of transaction-based return
depending on the degree of such heterogeneity. Contrary to
what the traditional appraisal smoothing theory would predict,
appraisal-based indices may not suffer any ‘‘smoothing’’ bias.
These ﬁndings suggest that the traditional appraisal smoothing
theory, which fails to consider the heterogeneity of appraiser
behaviors, exaggerates the effect of appraisal smoothing.
One of the most extensively documented observations in the real estate literature
is that appraisal-based return series (as exempliﬁed by the NCREIF Property
Indices) exhibit comparable returns to common stocks, but with much lower
volatility. That is, the risk-adjusted returns of commercial real estate are
signiﬁcantly higher than those of common stocks. This is often referred to as the
‘‘real estate risk premium puzzle’’ (Lusht, 1988; Shilling, 2003) as it suggests that
real estate rewards investors with additional premium for the same risk. The
consistently repeated observation and the desire to solve the ‘‘puzzle’’ have
prompted one of the leading theories in real estate: the appraisal smoothing theory.
As articulated by Geltner (1989, 1991) and many others, the foundation of
appraisal smoothing theory is that the seemingly ‘‘superior’’ performance of real
estate is essentially caused by the rational behavior that appraisers exhibit in their
practices. Particularly, it is believed that, in forming an appraisal estimate on a
given property, the appraiser tends to not only analyze the current market
information, but also gives some consideration to the past market information of
the same or similar properties. This is called partial adjustment behavior,a st h e
current market information is not given 100% consideration. This behavior444  Cheng, Lin, and Liu
effectively implies that appraisers tend to weight-average the past and present
information to form their appraisal opinion. An appraisal-based return series such
as the NCREIF Property Index (NPI), therefore, is essentially some sort of
‘‘moving average’’ of the underlying asset performance. As such, it is expected
to be ‘‘smoothed’’ and exhibit downward-biased volatility over time. Correcting
such bias, it has been argued, will lead to increased variance and reduced risk-
adjusted returns for real estate to the levels comparable to that of common stocks,
thus solving the ‘‘real estate risk premium puzzle.’’
Based on the assumed appraiser behavior, Geltner (1989, 1991) extended the work
of Blundell and Ward (1987) to propose a formal model known as the partial
adjustment model, in which the current appraisal return is expressed as a weighted
average of the past true property returns (or true property appreciation rates). This
model formalizes the smoothing argument and provides the normative foundation
for the theory. Over the past twenty years, the partial adjustment model has gained
wide popularity among academics, and is often taken as the theoretical launch
pad for studies that want to quantify the smoothing effect or develop de-smoothing
methodologies.
Despite repeated and often sophisticated elaborations by many studies from
various angles, it is worth noting that the whole idea of appraisal smoothing theory
is almost entirely motivated to explain one simple fact: the exceptionally low
volatility in the only industry standard benchmark of commercial real estate at the
time, the NPI. In retrospect, presented in this paper, it appears that we might have
leaped to ﬁnd the cause of a phenomenon before making sure to what extent that
phenomenon is actually real. This study examines the root of the appraisal
smoothing theory, re-examines the facts and logic behind the partial adjustment
model, and presents new empirical evidence to verify the key predictions of the
theory. After a brief review of relevant literature in the next section, the rest of
the paper presents three investigations of the appraisal smoothing theory:
First, the initial facts that motivated the appraisal smoothing theory are examined.
The ﬁndings show that the widespread belief of the NPI exhibiting extremely low
volatility turns out to be a biased observation that is valid only under the implicit
assumption that commercial properties are held for very short periods of time (i.e.,
a quarter or a year). Under longer and more practical holding periods, however,
the volatility of NPI is not nearly as low as previously believed. In other words,
had the variance of NPI been examined over more realistic investment horizon, it
might not have appeared so low as to prompt the idea of the appraisal smoothing
theory. The initial factual ground of the appraisal smoothing theory is thus
questionable.
Second, the logic behind the normative foundation (i.e., the partial adjustment
model) of the appraisal smoothing theory is re-examined. The ﬁndings show that
the model supports the traditional appraisal smoothing theory only under the
assumption of homogeneous appraiser behavior, that is, all appraisers exhibit
exactly the same partial adjustment behavior in terms of weighting past versusInformation and Appraisal  445
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present information. Previous literature generally discusses appraisal heterogeneity
in the context of appraisal errors in the return or value estimates. The current
study analyzes the impact of the other heterogeneity in the model: the choices
appraisers make in weighting past versus present information. When such
heterogeneity is considered, the model leads to a mixed outcome. The variance
of the appraisal-based returns is not always lower than the true variance; rather it
could be either higher or lower than the variance of transaction-based return
depending on the degree of such heterogeneity.
Third, the central prediction of the appraisal smoothing theory is empirically
veriﬁed. The prediction is that appraisal-based returns are expected to exhibit low
volatility and that, in the absence of appraisal inﬂuence, transaction-based returns
should exhibit signiﬁcantly higher volatility. Analyses using two well-respected
housing price indices indicate that appraisal-based returns exhibit moderately
higher (not lower) volatility than the transaction-based returns. This ﬁnding
contradicts what the smoothing theory would predict, but it is more consistent
with our theoretical investigation, which suggests appraisal-based returns may not
suffer any ‘‘smoothing’’ bias.
 Related Literature
After two decades of development, the notion that appraisal causes ‘‘smoothing’’
has become so entrenched in the literature that there is rarely any formal
investigation into the validity of the facts or logic upon which the appraisal
smoothing argument is based. Much of the appraisal smoothing literature simply
starts with the presumption that smoothing does exist, and proceeds in identifying
the magnitude of the smoothing effect and developing de-smoothing methods for
recovering the ‘‘true’’ volatility. Although the size of the literature is too large to
be reviewed here in detail, a comprehensive discussion on the evolution of the
appraisal smoothing theory and de-smoothing methodology can be found in
Geltner, MacGregor, and Schwann (2003), in which many prominent studies on
the subject are reviewed. The papers reviewed in this section are mainly those
that present conﬂicting evidences and arguments to the traditional appraisal
smoothing theory.
Webb, Miles, and Guilkey (1992) constructed a return index using only sold
properties, and reported that transaction-based portfolio returns have
approximately the same volatility as the appraisal-based portfolios. De Wit (1993)
compares in-house versus outside appraisals and ﬁnd that independent outside
appraisals suggest no signiﬁcant smoothing bias. Hendershott and Kane (1995)
develop a benchmark of property fundamental values and report the change of
fundamental (market) values exhibits less volatility than normally observed from
appraisal-based returns. Brueggeman, Chan, and Thibodeau (1992) use a non-
appraisal-based index to show that commercial real estate exhibits much higher
risk-adjusted returns than ﬁnancial assets during the 1972–1991 period, suggesting
that the ‘‘good data’’ (i.e., transaction-based index) do not exhibit volatility near446  Cheng, Lin, and Liu
the level of stocks. Cho and Megbolugbe (1996) compared an appraisal-based
index with a transaction-based index and found no evidence of signiﬁcantly lower
volatility in the appraisal-based index. A similar ﬁnding is also reported by
Chinloy, Cho, and Megbolugbe (1997), who compared the volatility of separate
purchase and appraisal data samples obtained from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
for 1975–1993, and found the appraisal data to be more volatile than the purchase
data. These anecdotal evidences, though important, are not direct challenges to
the appraisal smoothing theory, and they are often regarded as exceptions of what
the appraisal smoothing theory predicts.
The only direct challenge to the appraisal smoothing theory so far is a study by
Lai and Wang (1998), in which the authors take a theoretical approach to examine
the conditions and assumptions for the appraisal smoothing theory to hold. The
authors point out a subtle inconsistency in Geltner (1989, 1991) in which the
partial adjustment model is expressed as appraisal return being a moving average
of past true return, but is interpreted as appraisal value being a moving average
as past true values (not returns). They believe that this distinction is important.
They argue that the return-averaging assumption, though consistent with a lower
appraisal variance, is inconsistent with appraisers’ actual behavior, because the
true market returns are never observable. On the other hand, the value-averaging
assumption, though somewhat more realistic, is likely to require past true values
be approximated by past appraisal values in practice. And they show that, when
both the appraisal value and the true value of a property are assumed to be
stochastic, the resulted appraisal variance will be higher rather than lower. In a
comprehensive review of the appraisal smoothing literature, Geltner, MacGregor,
and Schwann (2003) counter the criticism of Lai and Wang (1998) by insisting
that the ‘‘moving average’’ process reasonably captures the manner by which
appraisers typically use the ‘‘comps’’ in practice. In the discussion of a general
version of the partial adjustment model (p. 1052, Eq. (20)), they continue to
disregard the distinction between the return-averaging and value-averaging
assumption that Lai and Wang (1998) deemed important.
The study of Lai and Wang (1998) is widely acknowledged in the subsequent
literature, but few have joined the debate on the issues they raised. Instead, the
majority of the research continues to press ahead under the assumption that
appraisal smoothing exists, and propositions for various de-smoothing methods
keep appearing in leading academic journals. To mention a few of the more
prominent ones, in a study of real estate allocation in mixed-asset portfolios,
Corgel and deRoos (1999) compared several de-smoothing models proposed by
other studies and ﬁnd that they all achieve the objective of inﬂating real estate
volatility and reducing real estate allocations. But the allocations seem to be rather
sensitive to which de-smoothing model used. By rationalizing the appraisal
process in a so-called sticky value framework, Brown and Matysiak (2000) argue
that, despite appraisal errors being small at individual property levels, it is still
necessary to de-smooth the aggregated index, though they concede that it isInformation and Appraisal  447
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unclear which de-smoothing procedure produces the best result. Clayton, Geltner,
and Hamilton (2001) note the lack of empirical support and calibration of the
partial adjustment model, and attempt to provide such support by conducting a
direct empirical test using a sample of Canadian commercial property that contains
both appraisal and information. They ﬁnd strong evidence that appraisers tend to
anchor on their previous appraisals to form the current estimates, which is a
behavior that the partial adjustment model is based upon. Their ﬁnding conﬁrms
the result of Diaz and Wolverton (1998), who ﬁnd the anchoring behavior of
appraisers to be signiﬁcant, a conclusion that was only weakly supported by an
earlier similar experiment of Diaz (1997). While Cho, Kawaguchi, and Shilling
(2003) continue to reﬁne the Fisher-Geltner-Webb de-smoothing technique (Fisher,
Geltner, and Webb, 1994) and apply both the original and revised procedures to
commercial property return indexes in the United States, United Kingdom, and
Japan, Pagliari, Scherer, and Monopoli (2005) simply use an earlier method
proposed by Geltner (1993) to de-smooth the NPI for performance comparison
between private and public real estate. Edelstein and Quan (2006), however,
suggest that de-smoothing may not be necessary because even if smoothing bias
exists at the individual property level, the individual errors may offset each other
at the aggregated index level. On the other hand, Wang (2006) continues to argue
for the necessity of de-smoothing and proposes a multivariate approach to uncover
the ‘‘true’’ real estate volatility without the assumption of a weak form market
efﬁciency that was implicitly made in some early studies. His method suggests
the ‘‘true’’ real estate volatility in the U.K. is about 1.5–2 times that of appraisal-
based series. Interestingly, also using commercial property data from U.K., Bond
and Hwang (2007, p. 378) ﬁnd that ‘‘the level of smoothing in appraisal-based
real estate indices is far less than assumed in many academic studies.’’
It is perhaps fair to say that, despite years of tremendous research effort, little
consensus has been established among academics beyond the general belief that
appraisal causes ‘‘smoothed’’ return series. There is little agreement with regard
to how much smoothing there is in the NPI and what model produces the best
de-smoothing outcome. In fact, it is not even clear whether researchers agree on
what the best outcome should be. While a market efﬁciency argument suggests
the de-smoothed real estate return should exhibit similar volatility as stocks,
Fisher, Geltner, and Webb (1994) argue the reasonable real estate volatility should
only be about half that of stocks, considering other risk factors of real estate. The
ﬁndings of Cho, Kawaguchi, and Shilling (2003) further suggest that the objective
of de-smoothing should at least vary across different countries and different
property types. As the objective of de-smoothing remains ad hoc and largely
subjective, it is not clear that a consensus will ever be reached on the degree of
smoothing bias in the NPI (or any appraisal-based real estate index), let alone a
practical and generally applicable de-smoothing method. Given this, it is perhaps
time to step back and reﬂect on how we got here in the ﬁrst place before we move
forward.448  Cheng, Lin, and Liu
 The Fact that Motivated the Appraisal Smoothing Theory
Despite its rather complex evolution over two decades, the appraisal smoothing
theory is mainly motivated by a simple observation: the NPI exhibits exceptionally
low volatility (variance) compared to stocks, so low that it cannot be explained
by classical pricing models. This observation can be easily conﬁrmed with the
publically available NPI today. The quarterly NPI for the period of 1978:Q1–
2008:Q4 was obtained for demonstration purposes. During this period, the average
quarterly return and standard deviation of the NPI was 2.45% and 1.70%,
respectively. On a per-unit-of-return basis, the risk-to-return ratio was 1.7%/2.45%
 0.69. For comparison, the same ratio for the quarterly S&P 500 Index during
the same period was 3.69. Clearly, the volatility of the NPI was indeed very low,
less than about one-ﬁfth of the S&P 500 on a per-unit-of-return basis. Few people
have doubted this fact because, ﬁrst, this is more than a NPI-only phenomenon.
Similar results have been consistently reported from various data sources and over
different time periods, some of which date back to the post-World War II era (e.g.,
Zerbst and Cambon, 1984; Sirmans and Sirmans, 1987). Second, the calculation
of mean and variance (or standard deviation) is so simple and straightforward that
nobody would doubt anything can go wrong with their computations.
One thing that few people have paid attention to, though, is the implicit investment
horizon assumed behind the calculations. Speciﬁcally, the mean and standard
deviation directly computed from a quarterly (or annual) index of NPI implies a
holding period of one quarter (or one year). Since real properties are typically
held for multiple quarters or years, does the single-period performance represent
the average periodic performance of a multi-period investment? In the ﬁnance
literature, we are used to assuming the answer is ‘‘yes,’’ because an efﬁcient
market implies that since the stock returns are reasonably independent and
identically-distributed (i.i.d.), the holding period is irrelevant. However, this is not
the case for real estate and the holding period may actually matter in this sector.
To ﬁnd out whether the real estate performance appears differently under different
holding periods, this study conducts a bootstrap-style simulation to examine the
quarterly NPI over the 1978:Q1–2008:Q4 period.
First, since the NPI is reported in quarterly returns, the entire series is converted
into an index with 1977:Q4 being 100. Taking the index as the original sample,
the simulation is run in the following steps: for a given holding-period, say one
year, a quarter is randomly picked in which to ‘‘buy’’ the portfolio at the index
level, then it is ‘‘sold’’ at the index level at the end of the holding period (i.e.,
four quarters later), and the ‘‘return’’ of this investment is computed. By repeating
this process and randomly buying the market at any time for 100,000 times
through re-sampling (with replacement), gives 100,000 simulated annual returns.
The average quarterly return and standard deviation is computed for these
simulated returns, along with the risk-to-return ratio (or risk per unit of return).
The ratios are then obtained for a different holding period, ranging from 1 to 36
quarters (9 years) by repeating the entire simulation process. For comparison, theInformation and Appraisal  449
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exact same process is applied to the quarterly S&P 500 Index over the same period
as the NPI. The simulation results are summarized in Exhibit 1.
The pattern of the risk per unit of return for the NPI is quite different from that
of the S&P 500. The ratio of the S&P 500 essentially moves horizontally with
modest ﬂuctuation, suggesting it is basically independent of the investment
horizon. In sharp contrast, the ratio for the NPI is highly horizon-dependent and
consistently increases with the holding period. At short horizons, the ratio is
consistent with the ‘‘exceptionally low volatility’’ or signiﬁcant ‘‘risk premium’’
that is so widely documented in the literature. However, as the holding period
becomes more realistic and longer, the difference between NPI and the S&P 500
quickly narrows, and eventually disappears as the holding period approaches 9
years (36 quarters) and beyond (which is not uncommon for commercial real
estate). This ﬁnding suggests that the conclusion that the NPI exhibits extremely
low volatility, which is what motivated the original idea of the appraisal smoothing
theory, turns out to be a partial truth and valid only when the holding period is
unrealistically short. Had the NPI performance been examined under more realistic
investment horizons (e.g., 5 years or longer), there would be a very different
perception about the volatility of the NPI, or commercial real estate in general.
But what about the fact that, in Exhibit 1, the risk-to-return ratio of NPI remains
below that of the S&P 500 throughout the 36 quarters? Does it suggest appraisal450  Cheng, Lin, and Liu
smoothing bias? If in theory the risk-to-reward ratios of stocks and real estate
should be about the same, there are two competing explanations. One is that the
volatility gap in Exhibit 1 is caused by what Lusht (1988) called the ‘‘non-
variance’’risk factors: illiquidity, lumpiness, high trading costs, etc. that are unique
to real estate. Since these factors must be priced in the marketplace by rational
investors, it is possible that when the risks associated with these factors are
properly accounted for, the total real estate risk would be close to that of stocks
on a per-unit-of-return basis. Essentially, what Lusht (1988) implies is that the
real estate pricing model (or the conventional performance metrics) are deﬁcient
in that they fail to price the non-variance factors, and he calls for the development
of new performance measures and pricing models that are more consistent with
real estate fundamentals.
The other explanation would be the appraisal smoothing argument. This
explanation basically attributes the volatility gap in Exhibit 1 to a ‘‘bad data’’
problem that is caused by a supposed appraiser behavior. De-smoothing is
essentially an effort of inferring good information from ‘‘bad’’ data. Although
both explanations can be true to a certain extent, recent studies by Lin and Vandell
(2007), Lin and Liu (2008), and Cheng, Lin, and Liu (2010a) have proposed a
new real estate risk metric that explicitly integrates illiquidity risk (time-on-market
risk) with price volatility. This risk metric, when applied to the NPI, suggests that
the risk-adjusted return is almost identical to that of stocks, leaving virtually no
room for the appraisal smoothing argument to explain the gap.
These recent studies aside, for those who believe that the volatility gap in Exhibit
1 is entirely caused by appraisal smoothing, it is at least obvious that, since the
volatility gap is horizon-dependent, so must be the objective of de-smoothing.
This is an important observation as it questions much of the de-smoothing
literature that disregards the holding period and attempts to inﬂate the appraisal-
based return volatility by a presumed ﬁxed proportion. For example, the
assumption that real estate volatility should be about half that of stocks (Fisher,
Geltner, and Webb, 1994) has to be reconsidered because, as shown in Exhibit 1,
the NPI’s volatility is already more than half that of stocks as soon as the holding
period exceeds 3 years (12 quarters). In reality, most real properties are held far
longer than 3 years (Cheng, Lin and Liu, 2010b). Had the NPI been examined
accordingly, there might be a different perception as to how ‘‘low’’ the NPI
volatility really is.
It is worth noting that the importance of the horizon-dependence of real estate
performance should not be underestimated. If the highly liquid and information-
efﬁcient ﬁnancial market is characterized by security returns being independent
and identically-distributed (i.i.d.), the illiquid and inefﬁcient private real estate
market is then characterized by property returns being horizon-dependent. The
real estate literature has extensively and repeatedly documented that property
prices do not follow the random walk and that returns over time exhibit serial
persistence (non-i.i.d.).1 This is a signiﬁcant distinction between the two markets
and it questions the validity of applying classical theories such as ModernInformation and Appraisal  451
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Portfolio Theory (MPT) and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to real
estate investment analysis. Models such as the MPT and CAPM are essentially
single-period models in which they assume all assets are to be held for ‘‘one
period,’’ and the optimal portfolio is one that maximizes the investor’s objective
over such a single-period horizon. The reality, however, is that assets are often
held for multiple periods of time. The validity of a single-period model to multi-
period investment is largely based on the studies by Merton (1969), Samuelson
(1969), and Fama (1970), among others, which show that an investor’s utility
maximization over multiple holding periods is essentially indistinguishable from
that over a single-period if asset returns are independent and identically-distributed
(i.i.d.) over time. Without the i.i.d. condition, these classical models are not
applicable to real estate. In other words, the ‘‘real estate risk premium puzzle’’
can very well be caused by inappropriate application of these single-period pricing
models and the traditional performance metrics. This issue, of course, should be
investigated more rigorously in separate studies.
 Examination of the Partial Adjustment Model
The discussion now turns to the normative foundation of the appraisal smoothing
theory: the partial adjustment model. First, the model is shown to only support
the appraisal smoothing argument under the implicit assumption of homogeneous
appraiser behavior. Second, once the implicit assumption is relaxed to recognize
heterogeneous appraisal behavior, the model is shown to be inconsistent with the
appraisal smoothing argument and may even support the opposite conclusion.
As proposed in Geltner (1989, 1991), the formal partial adjustment model
expresses the appraisal return as a weighted average of the current and past true
market returns:

˜ r*  w˜ r and w  1, (1)  ti t ii
i0 i0
where is the true market return in period t  i(i  0, 1, 2,...), and wi is the ˜ rti
corresponding weight the appraiser places based on his/her knowledge; wi is also
known as the smoothing parameter. Unlike Lai and Wang (1998), who challenge
the empirical justiﬁcation of the model in the ﬁrst place, the process begins
here by taking the partial adjustment model as given. That is, the proposed
methodology does not consider whether the model reasonably captures the
fundamental appraiser behavior in real life, the true market returns are obtainable,
or the inconsistency discerned by Lai and Wang (1998) that the model is expressed
as the average of past returns but often interpreted as the average of past values.
Obviously, these are all critical issues that question the validity of the model. But
the current study focuses on a different question: let’s assume the model is valid;452  Cheng, Lin, and Liu
however, is it really consistent with the appraisal smoothing argument that it is
intended to support?
How Does the Model Support the Appraisal Smoothing
Argument?
The smoothing effect (lower appraisal volatility) can be easily demonstrated if
there are only two periods in the model for mathematical simplicity. In practice,
a two-period model is not necessarily unrealistic as most appraisers typically only
look back to consider the most recent sales information on the same or comparable
properties (market comps). Thus, the appraisal return in period t of Equation (1)
can be rewritten as:
˜ r*  w˜ r  (1  w)˜ r , (2) tt t 1
where w is the weight placed on the current market information. It tends to be
higher if the appraiser is more conﬁdent about the current market information,
and vice versa.
For simplicity, suppose that and share the same distribution with mean u ˜ r˜ r tt 1
and variance 2 and the correlation between and is assumed to be .T h i s ˜ r˜ r t1 t
assumption will be relaxed later in the paper. For now, the volatility of the
appraisal return can be expressed as: ˜ r* t
22 Var(˜ r*)  Var[w˜ r  (1  w)˜ r ]  [w  (1  w) ttt 1
2  2w(1  w)] . (3)
Given that   1 and 0  w  1, then [w2  (1  w)2  2w(1  w)] 
[w2  (1  w)2  2w(1  w)]  1. Thus:
2 Var(˜ r*)   . (4) t
The equality holds only if   1. Therefore, when returns over time are not
perfectly correlated, Equation (4) suggests that the variance of the appraisal return
is always less than the variance of the true market return . In other words, ˜ r* ˜ r t t
appraisal returns always understate (or smooth out) the volatility of true real estate
returns, as long as Equation (2) is a reasonable representation of the partial
adjustment behavior for all appraisers. This is essentially the normative foundationInformation and Appraisal  453
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for the traditional appraisal smoothing theory. It demonstrates that appraisal causes
smoothing.
How Does the Model FAIL to Support the Smoothing
Argument?
An issue that has been given little consideration by previous literature, however,
is the choice of the ‘‘weights,’’ or the smoothing parameters, w. In one of the
model’s original presentations, Geltner (1991) suggests that, although the partial
adjustment is an individual behavior, the only difference between the models he
presented at the aggregated index level and the disaggregated individual level
(Equation (1) and (1a) of that paper) is that the individual appraisal errors are
diversiﬁed away at the aggregated level, but the weighting parameters remained
the same at both levels. This implies an implicit assumption: all appraisers, despite
their heterogeneous access to and interpretation of information from various
sources, would weigh the past versus present information in exactly the same way.
That is, appraisers exhibit homogeneous partial adjustment behavior. Subsequent
literature using the partial adjustment model has generally adopted the assumption
and treats the parameters as invariant across appraisers. It is under this assumption
that the partial adjustment model, as demonstrated above, supports the argument
that the appraisal variance is less than that of the true variance.
In reality, even if the ‘‘partial adjustment’’ is consistent with the appraisers’
behaviors in using past information such as identifying the ‘‘comps,’’ there is no
precise rule on how such adjustment ‘‘should’’ be done. Therefore, it is not hard
to imagine that, a certain degree of professional consensus notwithstanding,
heterogeneous ‘‘partial adjustment’’ exists even when there is no apparent
incompetence, negligence, or impropriety on the part of the appraisers. Such
heterogeneity implies that the smoothing parameter, although speciﬁc to each
individual appraiser at the disaggregated level, must exhibit cross-sectional
dispersion at the aggregated index or portfolio level and thus introduce another
source of variation into the partial adjustment model. The resulted appraisal return
index, therefore, is likely to exhibit larger variance than if the parameter is treated
as invariant.
It is necessary to note that this additional variation due to heterogeneous
smoothing parameter is not caused by some kind of random behavior of the
appraisers. It is due to the fact that all appraisers cannot, and indeed should not
weigh the past versus present information in exactly the same way because of
their differences in access to, and interpretation of information. The different
choice of smoothing parameter, therefore, is a result of rational appraiser behavior.
Each appraiser chooses the most appropriate weighting parameter based on his/
her professional judgment. At the aggregate level, the weights vary across
appraisers with certain dispersion. Ignoring such heterogeneity in the past may
have led us to exaggerate the smoothing effect on appraisal-based return indices.454  Cheng, Lin, and Liu
Below is a formal analysis that investigates the impact of heterogeneous partial
adjustment behavior on the resulted appraisal variance. In the context of the model
in Equation (2), this analysis begins by recognizing the cross-sectional variation
of the smoothing parameter.
Suppose that w follows a distribution with mean and variance 2 The variance 2 w  . w
essentially captures the variation of the smoothing parameter among appraisers. 2 w
Based on the conditional variance formula, the variance of the appraisal return
can be expressed as: ˜ r*
Var(˜ r*)  E[Var(w˜ r  (1  w)˜ r w)] tt t 1
 Var[E[w˜ r  (1  w)˜ r w]]. (5) tt 1
Since  (1  w) w]  u, hence Var  (1  w) w]]  0. E[w˜ r˜ r [E[w˜ r˜ r tt 1 t1 t
Simplifying Equation (5) yields:
22 2 Var(˜ r*)   E[w  2w(1  w)  (1  w) ]. (6) t
Note that w varies among different appraisers and it is distributed with mean w
and variance Given that  E[w  E(w)]2  E[w2]  then E[w2]  22 2  .  w , ww
 Equation (6) can then be simpliﬁed as: 22  w . w
22 2 2 2 Var(˜ r*)  2(1  )  [w  2w(1  w)  (1  w)]  . tw
(7)
Comparing Equation (7) with Equation (3), it can be seen that the second term of
Equation (7) is exactly the right-hand side of Equation (3). In other words,
Equation (7) shows that the traditional appraisal smoothing argument (Equation
(3)) understates the volatility of appraisal return by an amount of ˜ r* t
2(1  ) Given that this amount is always positive when,   1 depending 22 . w
on the magnitude of it is possible that the ﬁrst term 2(1  ) in Equation 22 2  ,  ww
(7) could be large enough to reverse Equation (4) such that  2.T h a t Var(˜ r*) t
is, the variance of appraisal returns may actually overstate the true volatility of
2. In any event, the positive ﬁrst term in equation (7) suggests that the smoothing
effect should be less than previously believed under the traditional appraisal
smoothing theory, which assumes w is invariant and  0. Therefore, once the 2 w
assumption of homogeneous partial adjustment behavior is relaxed to account for
appraisal heterogeneity, the partial adjustment model no longer necessarily
supports the appraisal smoothing argument.Information and Appraisal  455
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To see this point with an example, suppose that there are two types of appraisers
with equal numbers in the market and the correlation  is assumed to be zero for
simplicity. The ﬁrst type of appraiser has no conﬁdence in the current market
information and thus gives 100% weight to the return of last period and 0% weight
to the current information. However, the second type of appraiser is 100%
conﬁdent in the current information and thus will not consider the past information
in the valuation process. With this example, the weight w is distributed with mean
of  and variance of  Inserting these numbers in Equation (7) with 12 1 –– w  . 2 w 4
the assumption of,   0 gives:
22 11 1 22 2 Var(˜ r*)  2    1     .    t 42 2
This suggests that after considering cross-sectional variation among appraisers,
the variance of the appraisal return may not be reduced at all. However, based on
the traditional appraisal smoothing theory (ignoring the heterogeneity of appraisal
behaviors and assuming  0), the variance of appraisal return is only
2  2  . w 2
 Heterogeneous Appraisal under Changing Market
 Conditions
The discussion now turns to another aspect of the heterogeneous appraisal: the
time-varying nature of the smoothing parameter. A few studies have recognized
that, in weighting past versus present information, some appraisers may choose
different weight (w) at different times, or under different market conditions.
Matysiak and Wang (1995) suggest that the appraisal smoothing parameter w is
likely to be time-varying as appraisers would adapt their valuation process
according to market conditions. Brown and Matysiak (1998) applied the Kalman
ﬁlter approach to study the issue and found that the smoothing parameter varied
across market conditions. Their ﬁnding was conﬁrmed by Clayton, Geltner, and
Hamilton (2001), who examined this issue using a sample of Canadian properties.
They found that a greater smoothing effect (more temporal lag bias) is correlated
with periods of slow real estate market when fewer s and less current information
are available. While it is an empirical matter as to how much the smoothing
parameter varies over market conditions, the fact that it varies warrants an
extension of the analysis to the setting of changing market conditions.
In the last section, it is assumed that and share the same mean. In reality, ˜ r˜ r tt 1
the housing market may experience a good or bad time in the next period when
market conditions change. In other words, the expected return in period t may
become higher or lower than that of the previous period. Suppose that ut 
 . When   0, the market improves over the last period. When   0, ut1456  Cheng, Lin, and Liu
the opposite is true. The magnitude of  reﬂects the degree of how much the
market conditions change. Intuitively, since appraisers are less agreeable on how
to respond to dramatic market movements, they tend to either over- or under-react
to available information. Therefore, a dramatic change in the market conditions is
likely to be associated with a large dispersion of w, that is, is a function of 2 w
, i.e., When market conditions change, i.e.,  	 0, the second term of 2  (). w
Equation (5) becomes:
Var(E[w˜ r  (1  w)˜ r w])  Var(u  w) tt 1 t1
22  (). (8) w
As a result, when  	 0 Equation (5) can be further simpliﬁed as:
22 2 2 Var(˜ r*)  ()  2(1  ) () tw w
22 2  [w  2w(1  w)  (1  w)]  . (9)
Thus Equations (7) and (9) lead to:
22 Var(˜ r*  0)  Var(˜ r*  0)  () tt w
22 2  2(1  ) [ ()   ]. (10) ww
Since a larger dispersion of w is often associated with the change of market
conditions, i.e.,  Equation (10) implies that when the real estate 22  ()  , ww
market experiences a downturn or upturn, the appraisal returns are likely to
become more volatile.
Another relaxed assumption is that the variances of returns in periods t and
t  1 are equal. In reality, the variances may differ, especially when market
conditions change. Suppose that is distributed with mean ui and variance ˜ ri
(i  t, t  1), Equation (9) then becomes: 2 i
22 2 2 2 Var(˜ r*)  ()  (    2 ) () twt t 1 tt 1 w
22 22  [w   2w(1  w)  (1  w)  ]. (11) tt t 1 t1
Equation (11) is a general representation of the variance in appraisal-based returns
under changing market conditions and heterogeneous appraiser behaviors. In theInformation and Appraisal  457
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traditional appraisal smoothing arguments, which implicitly assume that all
appraisals share the same smoothing parameter (i.e.,  0), Equation (11) 2  () w
becomes:
22 Var(˜ r* ()  0)  w   2w(1  w) tw t t t 1
22  (1  w)  . (12) t1
The difference between Equations (11) and (12) is:
  Var(˜ r*)  Var(˜ r* ()  0) tt w
222 2  (      2 ) (). (13) tt 1 tt 1 w
 essentially captures the effect of heterogeneity of appraisal. Since  is always
positive,3 it implies that ignoring the heterogeneity of w understates the volatility
of appraisal-based returns and overstates the effect of smoothing. Furthermore,
when  t, it can been shown from Equation (11) that  That 2  Var(˜ r*)  . t1 tt
is, the appraisal-based returns may exhibit higher, rather than lower, volatility than
that of the true returns. Furthermore, given that   0,  0 and  0,
 
 ()  w
the smoothing effect suggested by the traditional appraisal smoothing theory is
exaggerated, to the larger extant when the dispersion of smoothing parameter
among appraisals is higher and/or when market conditions change dramatically.
The above theoretical analysis can be summarized in three ﬁndings. First, the
traditional appraisal smoothing argument, which state appraisal must result in
‘‘smoothed’’ returns, is only valid under the implicit assumption that all appraisers
exhibit exactly the same partial adjustment behavior and weigh the past versus
current information in the same way. Second, however, if one agrees that in reality
the appraisers’ weighting of past versus current information varies both cross-
sectional and over time, the appraisal variance will be higher than what is indicated
under the homogeneous assumption. This suggests that the smoothing effect is
not as strong as previously believed. Third, and more importantly, the ﬁndings
show that it is possible that, when the appraisal heterogeneity is high enough, the
resulted appraisal variance can actually exceed the true variance. In other words,
the partial adjustment model does not deﬁnitively support the appraisal smoothing
argument, that is, even if we do not question its validity in the ﬁrst place.
From a certain angle, these ﬁndings echo some of the earlier ﬁndings by Lai and
Wang (1998), in which the authors dispute the validity of the original model in
Equation (1). The conclusions here are drawn in a different way. That is, even if
the model in Equation (1) is taken as given, the appraisal variance is shown to be458  Cheng, Lin, and Liu
either higher or lower than the true variance depending on the degree of the
appraisal heterogeneity. In other words, there is no deﬁnitive connection between
appraisal and smoothing.
 A Reality Check on What the Appraisal Smoothing
 Theory Predicts
The above theoretical conclusions suggest that, depending on the degree of
appraisal heterogeneity, the partial adjustment model can result in appraisal
variance that is either higher or lower than the true variance (or not much different
from each other). This contradicts the traditional appraisal smoothing argument,
which predicts that appraisal-based returns necessarily exhibit low volatility and
that, in the absence of appraisal inﬂuence, transaction-based returns should exhibit
signiﬁcantly higher volatility. Empirical data are used next to examine which of
these predictions is more consistent with the reality.
The appraisal smoothing theory alleges the volatility of transaction-based real
estate returns should not be as low as what is observed from appraisal-based
returns such as the NPI. However, as surprising as it may be, there is virtually no
compelling evidence as to what the transaction-based volatility should be.T h e
difﬁculty is understandable. There is simply not a transaction-based index that is
‘‘otherwise comparable’’ with the appraisal-based NPI.4 Therefore, studies that
attempt to show the existence of smoothing bias often must make critical
assumptions about the transaction-based returns and appraiser behavior that causes
the bias. This approach effectively implies that the smoothing bias has to be
demonstrated based on assumption as oppose to facts. As Edelstein and Quan
(2006, p. 43) characterize the problem: ‘‘Smoothing is deﬁned as the deviation of
an index from one which is never observed; and since it is this deviation between
series which gives rise to the problem, it is not surprising smoothing is often
demonstrated based on assumptions made about the true series and appraiser
methodology and practice. ... Frequently, in the absence of empirical support, the
existence of smoothing is largely assumed and unsmoothing techniques amounts
to a contrived solution to an assumed problem.’’
Recently available data in the residential market has made it possible to directly
measure the degree of smoothing bias at the aggregate level. Although smoothing
has been mainly discussed in the context of commercial real estate, the partial
adjustment behavior, the alleged cause for smoothing, is common among both
commercial and residential appraisers. In fact, residential appraisers are known to
rely more on the so-called market comparable approach, which suggests they tend
to give more weight to the past price information. Therefore, if the partial
adjustment causes ‘‘smoothing,’’ the phenomenon should also be observable from
the housing market data.
In late 2004, the then Ofﬁce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO),
which later merged into the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) in OctoberInformation and Appraisal  459
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Exhibit 2  Historic Housing Price Changes Reported by the FHFA (formerly OFHEO)
Source: The Federal Housing Finance Agency news release, 2009:Q1.
2008, released a new ‘‘purchase-only’’ Home Price Index (HPI) to supplement its
original ‘‘All-Transaction Index.’’ Unlike the original index, which uses a large
sample mixed with housing sales and reﬁnancing deals (where the property value
is the appraisal value instead of sales price), the Purchase-Only Index excludes
reﬁnances from the whole sample, thus it is based on the part of the sample that
is free of appraisal bias. The portion of the ‘‘purchase’’ subsample averages about
42% of the whole sample over the period of 1991–2008, which implies that the
appraisal data (from reﬁnance deals) averages about 58% of the sample during
the same period. Such proportion is high enough for an appraisal effect to be
noticeable in the All-Transaction Index. Given that both indexes are constructed
with the same repeated sales methodology and differ only in whether their samples
include appraisal-based values, the difference in the volatilities of the two indexes
offers good indication of the appraisal effect.
A quick reality check of the appraisal effect can be found in the ofﬁcial FHFA
Quarterly News Release. Exhibit 2 is copied from the 2009:Q1 issue. Exhibit 2
displays the annualized historic returns of the two U.S. national indexes. If
the predictions of the appraisal smoothing argument is true, one would expect
that the appraisal-based index is more ‘‘smoothed’’ and the ‘‘better data’’ (i.e.,460  Cheng, Lin, and Liu
the transaction-based Purchase-Only Index) should exhibit signiﬁcantly higher
volatility.
Clearly, neither expectation is supported by Exhibit 2. In fact, the opposite seems
to be true. The purchase-only index is consistently less volatile and more
‘‘smoothed’’ than the appraisal-based All-Transaction Index during the 18-year
period, except perhaps in more recent quarters after 2007:Q3 when the ﬁnancial
crisis started, during which time the market is distorted by a disproportionally
large number of abnormal sales such as foreclosure and short sales with depressed
prices.
The simple fact presented in Exhibit 2 challenges the basic predictions of the
traditional appraisal smoothing theory. However, interpretation of Exhibit 2 should
be made with caution, because there is another source of noise in the All-
Transaction Index besides heterogeneous appraisal behavior. This is the ‘‘mix
ratio’’ between the purchase versus reﬁnance s in the sample, which may vary
over time.5 When the ratio is relatively stable, the difference in Exhibit 2 can be
attributed mainly to the appraisal effect. But when the ratio varies dramatically,
the variation may become a signiﬁcant source of noise. While it is not easy to
disentangle the two effects (heterogeneous appraisal and variant mix ratio) in the
All-Transaction Index, at least one point is clear: The two indices do not differ
signiﬁcantly, suggesting ‘‘better data’’ (i.e., the Purchase-Only Index) does not
exhibit signiﬁcantly higher volatility than the appraisal-based index. To the
contrary, the patterns of the two indices are more consistent with the argument
that an appraisal-based index does not suffer any smoothing bias at all.
Given the geographic diversity of the housing market, the investigation shown in
Exhibit 2 is extended to the regional sub-index level. The FHFA reports sub-
indices for the nine census regions (see the Appendix for a map of these regions).
Taking the All-Transaction and Purchase-Only Indices for each region over the
period of 1991:Q1–2008:Q4, Exhibit 2 is replicated for all nine regions and the
results are shown in Exhibit 3. The regional comparison between the two indices
exhibit rather a consistent pattern with the national results (Exhibit 2) in at least
two aspects. First, the appraisal effect, as indicated by the discrepancy between
the All-Transaction and the Purchase-Only Indices, seems to be rather modest in
most of the years except the latest market peak and the subsequent downfall.
Second, without exceptions, the volatility of the appraisal-based All-Transaction
Index seems higher (or less smoothed) than the Purchase-Only Index over time
and across most of the regions. While there is some room for interpretation, the
case for appraisal causing ‘‘smoothing’’ is rather difﬁcult to make in light of these
facts.
The historic trends reported in Exhibits 2 and 3 are annual changes of the housing
indices. These trends are consistent with the expectation of investors with a one-
year investment horizon. In reality, properties are held for various lengths of time.
Given the horizon-dependence of the NPI indicated in Exhibit 1, there is good
reason to believe residential real estate will exhibit the same characteristics.Information and Appraisal  461
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Therefore, the FHFA National Home Price Index is used to examine the appraisal
effect over various investment horizons. Since the Purchase-Only Index covers
only the period of 1991:Q1–2008:Q4, the range of hypothetical holding periods
is limited to be 1–20 quarters (or up to ﬁve years). Then the same simulation
approach that produced Exhibit 1 is applied to the two FHFA indices. The
simulated standard deviations of each index for each holding period are used to
compute the smoothing bias, which is measured as the percentage by which the
standard deviation of the All-Transaction Index differs from that of the Purchase-
Only Index for a given holding period. The results are shown in Exhibit 4.
Exhibit 4 clearly indicates that smoothing bias is also horizon-dependent.
‘‘Smoothing’’ can only be observed under short holding periods (less than 1.5
years). For example, at a holding period of one quarter, the standard deviations
of the two indexes (1.23% and 1.01%, respectively), which are the conventional
estimates of return volatilities from quarterly indexes, indicate the quarterly All-
Transaction Index understates the volatility of the Purchase-Only Index by
17.9%—a signiﬁcant ‘‘smoothing’’ bias. However, the quarterly return and risk
implicitly assume that an investor only holds the index portfolio for a single
quarter and sells it immediately, which is not possible in reality. As holding
periods becomes more practical (say, two years or longer), the appraisal bias
quickly shrinks and turns to positive. That is, the All-Transaction Index actually
overstates the standard deviations of the Purchase-Only Index, albeit by a modest
margin of about 2%–4%. These results are consistent with Exhibits 2 and 3 in
that they further suggest that it is a misperception that appraisal-based real estate
returns exhibit low volatility. Had the return volatility been examined under more
practical holding periods in some research, the traditional appraisal smoothing
argument would have appeared ill-supported empirically to begin with.
Some may note that, at a holding period of four quarters (one year), the smoothing
bias is still negative in Exhibit 4, which seems to contradict the annual index
changes shown in Exhibits 2 and 3. This is because the most recent several
quarters during which the market is distorted by rampant foreclosure and short
sales are included in the calculations, which causes the Purchase-Only Index to
exhibit signiﬁcantly higher volatility. However, the data period prior to the recent
ﬁnancial crisis is examined (i.e., 1991:Q1–2006:Q4), the standard deviation of the
annual Purchase-Only Index is 2.4%, versus 2.8% for the All-Transaction Index.
These results are therefore consistent with Exhibits 2 and 3, suggesting the
Purchase-Only Index is more ‘‘smoothed.’’ In addition, the serial correlation for
the annual returns of Purchase-Only Index is 0.73, versus 0.64 for the All-
Transaction Index during the same period. This ﬁnding contradicts yet another
traditional appraisal smoothing argument that predicts an appraisal-based index is
supposed to exhibit higher serial correlation than a transaction-based index.6
Residential data may not be ideal for examining the traditional appraisal
smoothing theory, as the theory is mainly developed for commercial real estate.
However, if using past market information is a common behavior among
residential and commercial appraisers, the impact of partial adjustment should beInformation and Appraisal  463























































































































































































































































.464  Cheng, Lin, and Liu
observable in both residential and commercial real estate data. Furthermore, recent
study suggests that the difference between commercial and residential real estate
markets should not be overly exaggerated. For example, Gyourko (2009) has
presented some rather comprehensive evidence showing the inextricable
connections between the economic and ﬁnancial fundamentals of commercial and
residential real estate. He ﬁnds that, among other things, the property value
appreciation in owner-occupied houses and commercial properties move together
contemporaneously and over time, despite the fact that the two markets are driven
by demand from two groups of buyers that differ greatly in their motivations,
preferences, and decision criteria. Finally, it is necessary to point out that the
theoretical analysis presented here does not depend on any data. So the
imperfection of the data should not affect the main conclusions of the analysis.
 Conclusion
This study examines the empirical motivation and normative foundation of
traditional appraisal smoothing theory. First, it examines the widely reported ‘fact’
that motivated the appraisal smoothing argument in the ﬁrst place: the
‘‘exceptionally low volatility’’ of the appraisal-based NPI. The ﬁndings show that
the fact is based on an incomplete observation, which is valid only for
unrealistically short holding periods (a year or a quarter). When more realistic and
longer holding periods are considered, the NPI’s volatility (per unit of return) is
not as low as previously believed compared to that of stocks. The fact that the
volatility gap between stocks and real estate in Exhibit 1 is horizon-dependent
further suggests that it is inappropriate to de-smooth the NPI by inﬂating its
volatility by a presumed percentage.
Second, a formal analysis is conducted to demonstrate that the appraisal smoothing
theory is supported by the partial adjustment model only under the assumption of
homogeneous appraiser behavior that all the appraisers weigh the past versus
current information in exactly the same way. By relaxing the homogenous
assumption, the heterogeneous appraisal behavior will result in appraisal variance
that is higher than under the homogeneous condition, implying that the appraisal
smoothing effect, if it exists, is not as strong as the traditional appraisal smoothing
theory suggests. Furthermore, it is possible that the heterogeneity may be to such
a degree that the resulted appraisal variance actually exceeds the true variance.
That is, appraisal may exaggerate, rather than understate the true variance of real
estate returns.
Third, empirical evidence from the residential market is presented, which
consistently suggests, historically, the appraisal-based FHFA All-Transaction
Index in fact appears to be slightly less (not more) ‘‘smoothed’’than the Purchase-
Only Index. This evidence is consistent with the theoretical ﬁndings, as they
suggest that the appraisal heterogeneity may indeed be such that an appraisal-
based index actually exceeds (albeit moderately) the variance of an otherwise
comparable transaction-based index. The facts contradict the central prediction ofInformation and Appraisal  465
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the traditional appraisal smoothing theory: the transaction-based index should have
signiﬁcantly higher volatility than the appraisal-based index.
The ﬁndings of this study have three implications. First, if real estate performance
is horizon-dependent and appraiser behaviors are heterogeneous, inferring true
market volatility from an appraisal-based index is even more complex than
what the de-smoothing literature has attempted before. Given the appraisers’
heterogeneous treatment of information in aggregate, and smoothing bias that may
exist at the individual property level, the ultimate volatility of the index depends
on which inﬂuence dominates the other. De-smoothing may be the wrong thing
to do because the appraisal-based index may already overstate the true volatility,
as the FHFA indices suggest in this paper. Therefore, both inﬂuences should be
understood and properly controlled before inferring the true market volatility from
an appraisal-based index. This suggests an interesting empirical research: How
different are appraisers in choosing their smoothing parameters, both cross-
sectionally and over time?
Second, if the FHFA indices are indicative of the commercial real estate market,
as Gyourko (2009) suggests, the NPI may not suffer much smoothing bias after
all. As the longest and most observed market index for commercial real estate,
the credibility of the NPI, and to some extent, the credibility of the appraisal
industry in general, has been severely undermined by the appraisal smoothing
theory in recent years. While many studies often blame the smoothing bias for
their nonsensical ﬁndings, some researchers have dismissed the NPI as completely
useless. This kind of criticism appears premature in light of the ﬁndings of this
study. Smoothing bias may exist at individual property level, but its impact to the
aggregated index is likely to be largely offset by the inﬂuence of the appraisal
heterogeneity.7 In the end, the index will not be as smoothed as many had believed,
especially when it is viewed under more realistic investment horizons.
Finally, how can the long standing real estate risk premium puzzle be explained?
The traditional appraisal smoothing theory can no longer provide a credible
explanation, as the theory does not seem to stand up well against simple logic
and facts. Therefore, in order to understand why real estate exhibits higher risk-
adjusted returns than ﬁnancial assets (i.e., the real estate risk premium puzzle), it
is perhaps useful to reconsider the alternative direction suggested by Lusht (1988).
In his presidential address to the American Real Estate and Urban Economics
Association in 1988, Lusht points out the fact that ‘‘in real estate markets more
than variance affects price.’’ That being the case, he argued: ‘‘less variance is not
an uncomforting ﬁnding, but rather precisely what we would expect in markets
where more than variance is priced.’’ These non-variance factors include
illiquidity, heterogeneity, high trading costs, etc. His view is concurred by Lai and
Wang (1998, p. 532), who state: ‘‘a potentially more fruitful way to study why
the variance of property returns is lower than that of stock market after adjusting
for risk is to examine the unique characteristics of property markets.’’ Until the
unique characteristics of real estate is properly captured and priced in a new real466  Cheng, Lin, and Liu
estate risk metric, fair comparison of the performances between real estate and
stocks, as well as the proper role of real estate in a mixed-asset portfolio, will
remain a major challenge facing academics and practitioners alike.
 Appendix
  The Nine Census Regions used by OFHEO
 Endnotes
1 The literature on the subject is too large to be reviewed here fully. A few examples
include Case and Shiller (1989), Young, and Graff (1995), Englund, Gordon, and Quigley
(1999), and Gao, Lin, and Na (2009), among others.
2 The analysis does not require the assumption of a speciﬁc distribution for w. It only
assumes that the mean and variance of w can be estimated.
3 It can be shown that   (
2   2t ()  [
2 
22 2   ) tt 1 t1 w
(t   0.
22  )]  () t1 w
4 Recently, however, NCREIF has adopted the MIT transaction-based index. But this new
index is constructed with a very different methodology and is not ‘‘otherwise
comparable’’ with the traditional NCREIF Property Index in terms of index methodology.
5 In this regard, the NPI also includes sales when the property is sold. So, like the All-
Transaction Index, the NPI is an appraisal-based, but not appraisal-only index, although
its ‘‘mix ratio’’ may be quite different.
6 The authors thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the comparison of serial
correlations for the two indices.Information and Appraisal  467
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7 For instance, based on an analysis of housing data from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
over the 1975–1993 period, Chinloy, Cho, and Megbolugbe (1997, p. 97) conclude that
‘‘smoothing is less of a problem than the volatility induced by small sample size and
heterogeneous beliefs among appraisers.’’
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